Novi-whats and the Chemical Weapons Convention by McLeish, Caitriona & Revill, James
Between furious accusations, numerous questions,references to literary classics and TV shows, diplomaticexpulsions, leaked recordings of telephone calls and
government statements about a cat and two guinea pigs, it is
easy to become distracted by the drama surrounding the
poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal and Police Sergeant Nick
Bailey in Salisbury on 4 March. Each twist and turn is grimly
fascinating to observe, but amid this drama there appears to
lurk the suggestion that the scope of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) can be reduced to the lists of chemicals
contained within one of its annexes. This is not the first time
such an idea has been raised - nor is it likely to be the last -
but following events in Salisbury, as well as in Malaysia, Syria
and Iraq, it has become ever more important to push back
against this pernicious misreading of the treaty. 
Novi-whats? 
Toxic chemicals are being used for hostile purposes with
alarming frequency. In the Salisbury incident, the agent used
has been identified by scientists at Porton Down as a member
of the Novichok class of agents1. The finding was confirmed
through the analysis of environmental and biomedical
samples by one of the Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons’ (OPCW) designated laboratories2. 
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Professor Caitriona McLeish and Dr James Revill, from the Science Policy Research
Unit at Sussex University on not allowing newcomers to be excluded from the club…
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The open source literature about this series of agents is
relatively modest and what is known largely comes from
former participants in the Soviet chemical warfare
programme, particularly Vil Mirzayanov. From this
literature, we can surmise that Novichok or ‘newcomer’ is
the name given to a series of next generation chemical
warfare agents developed by the Soviets, and later the
Russians, as part of the Foliant programme. Speculation
about the objectives for developing these agents includes
that they were designed to “defeat Western detection and
protection measures”3 and be more readily hidden “within
a legitimate commercial industry” so as to circumvent
international controls.4 At least five Novichok class agents
are referenced in the open literature5, including no less
than two binary agents, Novichok-7 which is purportedly
10 times more lethal than Soman and Novichok-5
supposedly five to eight times more effective than VX.
The first news relating to the Novichok agents appeared
in 1991 when Mirzayanov published an article in a Russian
newspaper decrying environmental safety hazards
emanating from their development that had just “begun at
full speed” at his workplace.6 In September the following
year, he co-authored a similar article with Lev Fedorov in
which further details were provided. These included the
identity of the institute where the “new toxic agent was
created” ('GSNIIOKhT') and the suggestion that field tests
had been conducted at a facility near Nukus in
Uzbekistan.7 It was this article which influenced the first
report in Western media, with Will Englund of the
Baltimore Sun describing the new agents as “highly lethal
binary nerve agents”.8
Novichoks and chemical disarmament
Looking back, the timing of the revelations seems
unfortunate. The 1991 article did not receive the attention
we might now wish it had, and the 1992 articles came
after the draft Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) had
been finalised and accepted by the UN general assembly.9
But in terms of the Salisbury incident it doesn’t matter
when we first became aware of them because Article II of
the CWC is very clear: all toxic chemicals and their
precursors are chemical weapons except where they are
intended for “purposes not prohibited under this
convention.”10 Defining toxic chemicals as “[a]ny chemical
which through its chemical action on life processes can
cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm
to humans or animals", purpose is the criterion by which
the convention defines a chemical weapon. Sometimes
referred to as the general purpose criterion, this purpose
based definition ensures the convention cannot be
overtaken by technological change. As Robinson noted in
1996, the convention applied “to weapons that were still
secret, such as the much vaunted Russian Novichoks, and
even to toxic chemicals yet undiscovered”.11
Accordingly, Mirzayanov’s suggestion, which has been
echoed in the contemporary debate, that “if a weapon is
not listed, then it cannot legally be banned, to say nothing
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of being controlled”12 is a misreading of the convention. The
lists being referenced are the three schedules of chemicals
which were negotiated to “facilitate practical verification
measures.”  Novichoks do not appear in the schedules and so
remain absent from the declarations. In part, this is because
revelations about them came after the negotiations had
concluded and because Russia denied developing them. This
remains the Russian position, as shown in various statements
including one from their delegation to the OPCW’s executive
council: “No research and development or experiments were
conducted under the Novichok code name within the Russian
Federation”14. A government representative in Moscow stated:
“I want to make it perfectly clear that Russia has not
produced any toxic agents other than those it has declared
under the CWC in 1997.”15
Linking Novichoks to the matter of declarations of
scheduled chemicals can easily lead to confusion for those
unfamiliar with the text, as to whether Novichoks are covered
by the CWC. But the convention is unequivocal: such agents
are covered. These lists, and the declarations which come
from them, have nothing to do with the scope of the
convention and indeed, so as not to leave doubt, the relevant
annex states “these schedules do not constitute a definition of
chemical weapons.”16
Wider context 
Attempting to privilege the schedules over the purpose
based definition of chemical weapons - or create a
distinction between “chemicals as weapons” and “chemical
weapons” - best serve the interests of those seeking to
undermine collective efforts towards a world free of
chemical weapons. In these troubling times, the Salisbury
poisoning, the assassination in Malaysia and the apparent
normalisation of chemical weapons use in Syria are
elevating perceptions about the threats posed by chemical
weapons and provide renewed impetus for chemical
defence activities and institutions. 
Research related to protection is regarded as a
permitted purpose under the CWC, and rightly so.
Through wider initiatives that seek to improve
understanding of potential chemical weapons threats,
however, there also exists the potential that alluring new
agents may be stumbled upon, which could exploit areas
of constructive ambiguity found within the text of the
convention. Like Novichoks, such agents are unlikely to
appear on the schedules, which makes it imperative that
there is a robust countering of the apparent “pernicious
ignorance”17 embodied in list based understandings of the
scope of the CWC. 
With the fourth review conference taking place later this
year, states parties need to collectively reaffirm the broad
scope of the convention as articulated in Article II. At this
current juncture with chemical weapons being used with
growing frequency and divisions apparent in the OPCW’s
decision making bodies, this might not seem a priority.
However, unless states are able to reach a shared
understanding about what is, and isn’t, a chemical weapon,
and what is, and isn’t, permitted under the convention,
efforts to prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons can
surely be unravelled. 
Novi-whats
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